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In the spring of 1874 the Japanese government dispatched a military expedition 
to southern Taiwan, known in most Japanese studies as the Taiwan Expedition. 
One purpose of the expedition was to punish a group of aborigines who had mur-
dered several dozen people from Ryu¯kyu¯ late in 1871,1) but another more important 
purpose was to establish colonies along the east coast of the island in the hope that 
Japan would be able to take over the entire island in a few year’s time.  The expedi-
tionary force landed in southern Taiwan early in May, 1874 and after a few brief bat-
tles it established Japanese control over the area and began a six-month long occupa-
tion that turned out to be fairly uneventful.  While the expeditionary force 
succeeded in its goal of punishing the aborigines it did not accomplish the goal of es-
tablishing colonies in Taiwan.  There were a number of reasons why Japan’s coloni-
zation of Taiwan did not begin in 1874, mainly because of strong opposition by the 
Qing government but also perhaps because the Japanese navy proved surprisingly 
weak in its effort to support the expedition.  The experience of the Japanese navy in 
1874 provides a striking contrast to the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, where the 
Japanese navy defeated the Chinese navy and Japan claimed Taiwan as a colony.  It 
also contrasts with the gunboat diplomacy that Japan used successfully against Ko-
rea and that resulted in the signing of the Kanghwa Treaty in 1876.  These events 
give the impression that Japan had a strong navy but the Taiwan Expedition sug-
gests a different story.  While sources about the Taiwan Expedition do not directly 
mention the matter, it is likely that one of the lessons that the expedition taught the 
Japanese government was the fact that Japan needed a stronger navy.  The need for 
a strong navy arose, of course, in the wake of the Meiji Restoration when Japan be-
gan to exercise its power in East Asia in new ways, including the effort to establish 
new diplomatic relations with China and Korea and to establish a colonial empire. 
This paper will evaluate the role of the Japanese navy in 1874 in order to demon-
strate some of the problems the Japanese government encountered when it tried to 
extend its power to Taiwan and establish colonies there.
The Importance of Naval Power in the Taiwan Expedition
From the outset people involved in planning and implementing Japan’s invasion 
of southern Taiwan recognized the importance of naval power to the success of the 
expedition.  One advisor, a former American diplomat named Charles LeGendre, 
anticipated war between China and Japan and in several memoranda he wrote for 
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the Japanese government in the fall of 1872 he described the preparations he 
thought Japan needed to make for the expedition, including details about how naval 
power would be necessary.  LeGendre wrote the memos at the request of the foreign 
minister at the time, Soejima Taneomi, and his memos helped the Japanese govern-
ment develop its strategy for how to deal with the so-called Taiwan problem.2)  In 
the memos LeGendre provided many speciﬁc ideas about how the Japanese govern-
ment could justify annexing Taiwan and he may have also helped suggest the idea 
that Soejima should lead an embassy to Beijing in order to resolve the so-called au-
dience question, a dispute about whether the Tongzhi emperor should permit West-
ern diplomats to present their credentials to him.  In any event LeGendre helped 
prepare Soejima for the embassy that went to China in 1873.  LeGendre thus provid-
ed the Japanese with a wide range of suggestions and advice about how to deal with 
Taiwan and the Chinese government.
In the second of the memos he wrote for Soejima, LeGendre addressed the ques-
tion of what military action the Japanese would need to take in the event of war be-
tween China and Japan over Taiwan.3)  The memo began with the simple prediction 
that during the planned negotiations in Beijing the Zongli yamen, the bureau in the 
Qing government that dealt with Western governments and the Japanese, would 
claim the Ryu¯kyu¯ Kingdom as a dependency of China and the aboriginal territory of 
Taiwan as an integral part of the Qing empire.  If the Chinese government did so 
then the responsibility to punish the parties who had murdered the Ryu¯kyu¯ans in 
1871 would fall to China, but the memo predicted that the Chinese government 
would likely deny its responsibility.  The memo further predicted that if China de-
nied its responsibility the conﬂict would probably result in war between China and 
Japan, but the memo suggested that before Japan resorted to war its negotiators 
should at least ask whether China would be willing to cede Taiwan to Japan.
The memo gave three rationales that might be used in pressing Japan’s argument. 
First, because China had failed to extend its administration to the southeastern part 
of the island and foreign ships regularly passed that way it was inevitable that West-
erners would eventually lay claim to the territory, and Japan would not welcome for-
eign control over Taiwan.  Second, in contrast to the character of Chinese soldiers, 
the character of the Japanese “mountaineers” made them capable of defeating the 
aborigines, and Japan would be willing to devote the necessary time, expense and 
military power to the task of developing and educating them.  Third, it would be 
better for China if Japan took control of Taiwan rather than a Western country be-
cause Japanese customs were closer than Western customs to those of China.
LeGendre believed that these rationales offered little chance for success, however, 
and that war between China and Japan was more or less inevitable.  He devoted the 
balance of the memo to an explanation of various preparations Japan should make 
in order to ﬁght the war with China that would result from the expected failure of 
Soejima’s negotiations.  Before Soejima departed for Beijing, the memo argued, the 
government should lay up food and weapon stores for the military and station eight 
thousand troops on Miyakojima, in Ryu¯kyu¯.  It should also have on hand a large 
warship and a smaller steam vessel to patrol the South China coast and the Taiwan 
Straits.  If war broke out those ships could blockade the ports of the Pescadores, and 
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three additional gunships would be sufﬁcient to protect the troop transports travel-
ing from Miyakojima to Taiwan and they could control the open ports of Taiwan if 
necessary.  LeGendre gave over the balance of the memo to a description of the key 
ports in the area and their defensive fortiﬁcations, how the Japanese troops and war-
ships should be deployed in and around Taiwan and how the campaign to capture 
the western half of the island should be conducted.  An addendum to the memo not-
ed that since it would be difﬁcult to mount a sea offensive from Miyakojima the Jap-
anese troops should be based instead at Nagasaki.  The memo thus shows that the 
government was discussing new ideas about Japanese territorial expansion soon af-
ter the Meiji Restoration, that the government understood territorial expansion 
might provoke a war between China and Japan and that naval power was necessary 
to Japanese territorial expansion.
Another memorandum that LeGendre wrote for Soejima around the end of 1872 
or beginning of 1873 spelled out an even more aggressive vision of the new role that 
Japan might play in East Asia.4)  This memo, the fourth that LeGendre wrote, 
framed the discussion of Japanese policy toward Taiwan in terms of power politics 
and it proposed a regional view of Japanese foreign policy that linked a wide range 
of problems that Japan faced in its relations with Russia, Korea, Ryu¯kyu¯, Taiwan and 
China.  The memo began by stressing the threat of foreign colonization in the re-
gion.  Western powers hoped to extend their inﬂuence in East Asia, it argued, and 
they had an ideal opportunity in the potential colonization of Korea to Japan’s north 
and Taiwan to its south.  In order to protect itself from this threat Japan should use 
the failure of the Chinese government to punish the aborigines of southern Taiwan 
as a pretext for annexing Taiwan and the Pescadores.  LeGendre justiﬁed this argu-
ment based on an assessment of international conditions at the time.  As the conﬂict 
between Britain and Russia over the “Eastern Question” grew worse the danger of 
war between the two countries would increase and Russia might conspire to have 
Prussia occupy Taiwan in order to draw it into an alliance against the British in East 
Asia.  The memo assumed that Western powers would use force to annex Taiwan 
but the powers had a problem in that they had no pretext for war with China.  The 
audience question might provide a justiﬁcation for war if it could not be resolved sat-
isfactorily, and Japan should take advantage of this opportunity by dispatching an 
embassy to Beijing to open negotiations about the Ryu¯kyu¯ans who had been mur-
dered in southern Taiwan.  When the negotiations had reached their most precari-
ous point Japan should seize the initiative and occupy Taiwan and the Pescadores by 
force or through negotiations.  The memo predicted that the Western powers would 
not intervene because Britain and Russia would prefer to see Japan rather than a ri-
val power occupy Taiwan.
LeGendre next broadened his analysis of geopolitics to link Japan’s interests in 
Korea to the vision of annexing Taiwan.  “If Japan were to occupy the Korean pen-
insula,” the memo argued,
Japan would gain free rein for its inﬂuence as far as the Yellow Sea.  It cannot 
be said that Japan currently controls the shore of the Japan Sea on the Korean 
side and it would cause Japan ceaseless worries if Russia or another power 
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came to that opposite shore and occupied it.  It would be the same, for exam-
ple, as the constant deceit and bickering Turkey receives and the abuse it suf-
fers because it is separated by only a single expanse of water from a great pow-
er [Russia].
The memo identiﬁed Korea as the most important point in northern Asian be-
cause of its convenient position for trade and communication and its easy defensibil-
ity.  It also suggested that Japan could protect itself from the twin threats of Russian 
expansion and Chinese collapse by occupying Korea, Taiwan and the Pescadores. 
The memo spelled out some of the strategic possibilities that had been created by Ja-
pan’s new foreign policy after the Meiji Restoration.  The memo assumed Japan’s 
alignment with the West, reﬂecting a major policy shift that had taken place only 
months after the new Meiji government took power in 1868.  The memo also as-
sumed that Japan could escape Asia and enter Europe, to borrow Fukuzawa Yu-
kichi’s famous phrase, and it proposed a sweeping enlargement of Japanese foreign 
policy that envisioned the use of coordinated geopolitical thinking, territorial ex-
pansion, the ideology of a civilizing mission for Japan in East Asia and warfare.  The 
overall purpose of this effort would be, of course, for Japan achieve its security by 
replacing China as the dominant power in the region.
In spelling out this vision of Japan’s new role in East Asia LeGendre did not ex-
plicitly address the necessity of naval power, but it is obvious that naval power would 
be needed to achieve the goals outlined in his memos.  The course of action that 
LeGendre proposed had a considerable inﬂuence on the Japanese government’s pol-
icy toward Taiwan and China, but there were many problems with his proposals and 
they were far from universally popular in the Japanese government.  Perhaps the 
most serious problem posed by the memos is that they accepted war between China 
and Japan as a given.  Soejima embraced this assumption wholeheartedly but his 
willingness to resort to war caused alarm among other members of the Japanese 
government.  Strong disagreements about Soejima’s intentions led to protracted de-
bates about what he should try to accomplish during his mission to Beijing and what 
limits should be placed on his actions, and Soejima in fact asked LeGendre to pre-
pare his fourth memo in order to address some of the concerns that had been raised 
by others in the government.  The aggressive nature of LeGendre’s fourth memo 
produced even more alarm, however, especially because Soejima would be dis-
patched to Beijing as a minister plenipotentiary and as such would have consider-
able latitude in deciding whether to commit Japan to war with China.  Consequently 
the Japanese cabinet pressed Soejima to clarify his intentions in a ﬁfth memoran-
dum.  The cabinet rejected the ﬁrst draft of that memo as too belligerent because it 
still accepted the possibility of war with China in order for Japan to colonize Taiwan, 
but even the second draft was not much less belligerent.  Soejima obdurately stuck 
to his position despite the cabinet’s reservations.5)  The possibility of war with China 
was the sticking point in the government’s debate, and in order to restrain Soejima 
the cabinet eventually issued orders that speciﬁcally restricted him to the purpose of 
fulﬁlling the state’s duty to its people (kokumin ni taisuru gimu), a reference to the 
Ryu¯kyu¯ans who had been murdered in Taiwan, and it enjoined him from pursuing 
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the long-term geostrategic plans that had been spelled out in LeGendre’s memos.6)
LeGendre’s memos also included a second problem that did not provoke any 
comments at the time and apparently did not attract any notice but that became 
quite obvious during the expedition that took place in 1874: the plan assumed that 
the Japanese navy was strong enough to carry out simultaneously the colonization of 
Taiwan and a potential war with China.  LeGendre had served as an ofﬁcer in the 
Union army during the American Civil War and his army service undoubtedly col-
ored his understanding of warfare, so he may have underestimated the importance 
of the role the navy would play.  Nevertheless, during the years he spent as the U.S. 
Consul in Amoy LeGendre had worked closely with several U.S. navy ofﬁcers and 
he learned from his experiences how much he needed U.S. naval support in order to 
be effective in his job as consul.  As a result of his experiences in Amoy and Taiwan 
LeGendre understood the need for naval power, and his memos expressed that un-
derstanding, clearly envisioning the possibility of sea-based warfare against the Chi-
nese.  For whatever reason, however, LeGendre never assessed the ability of the Jap-
anese navy to support the ambitious plans outlined in his memos, and apparently no 
one openly challenged Soejima’s plans for an expedition to Taiwan on the basis of 
the weakness of the Japanese navy.
In the end war did not break out between China and Japan in 1874, and even if it 
had broken out it probably would have unfolded very differently from what LeGen-
dre envisioned.  Still, his plan shows us what some of the navy’s goals might have 
been in case of war: to protect the Japanese troops being sent to Taiwan, to defend 
the ports of Taiwan and to control the Pescadores.  Other participants in the expedi-
tion besides LeGendre also made observations about the importance of naval sup-
port, and the invasion of southern Taiwan undoubtedly taught the Japanese govern-
ment several important lessons about using naval power to establish a colonial 
empire.
The Early Modern Sources of Japan’s Naval Weakness
It is likely that one of the lessons that the government learned from the Taiwan 
Expedition is that the Japanese navy was too weak to sustain an overseas empire. 
The Japanese government must have taken the navy’s weakness into consideration 
when it discussed the risks of war with China after the expedition had been dis-
patched, but there are few records that openly assess the strength of the navy.7)  The 
biggest weaknesses were obvious and may not have needed to be mentioned.  In 
fact, most of the weaknesses of the navy were nothing new and could be traced back 
to the policies of the Tokugawa bakufu.
In the early Meiji period the Japanese navy, while weak, was still stronger than it 
had been in the early modern period, and by the time of the Taiwan Expedition ef-
forts to strengthen the navy had been ongoing for nearly two decades.  The weak-
ness of the Japanese navy in the early Meiji period can be traced back to the policies 
of the bakufu toward foreign trade and coastal defense that dated in some cases to 
the seventeenth century.8)  In the early modern period the bakufu limited seaborne 
trade in order to control the Japanese population and especially to prevent rival 
lords (daimyo¯) from attaining wealth that might permit them to challenge the power 
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of the Tokugawa family.  Because it had banned large, sea-going vessels the bakufu 
had to rely on land-based coastal defenses rather than a navy in order to protect Ja-
pan from potential foreign threats.  In effect the bakufu’s policies assumed that a 
strong navy was not necessary because Japan’s geographical isolation was sufﬁcient 
to protect the country from foreign military threats, and in the rare cases where for-
eign ships might approach Japan coastal gun batteries would be sufﬁcient to defend 
the country.
The bakufu’s policies worked well enough until Western powers, starting with 
Russia in the late-eighteenth century and continuing with Britain and the United 
States in the nineteenth century, challenged Japan’s reliance on geographical isola-
tion and land-based coastal defenses.  As early as 1791 Hayashi Shihei identiﬁed the 
danger posed by European naval power in his book Kaikoku heidan (Discussion of the 
Military Problems of a Maritime Country).  Hayashi warned that “From Nihonbashi in 
Edo to China and then to Holland stretches a sea route without limit,”9) in other 
words nothing but water separated Japan from its potential enemies, and he argued 
that Japan needed naval forces in addition to coastal gun batteries in order to defend 
the country from seaborne threats.  More than a century earlier the bakufu had 
banned the large ships that were necessary to defend Japan from the sea, and Hayas-
hi’s open criticism of the bakufu’s policy led to his arrest.10)  Japan’s vulnerability 
from the sea continued unabated, however, and the bakufu responded by not by in-
troducing a navy but rather by attempting to strengthen coastal defenses.  In 1825 
the bakufu attempted to address the growing Western threat from the sea by issuing 
the Ikokusen uchiharai rei (Foreign Ship Expulsion Edict), a hard line edict that or-
dered domains in coastal areas to ﬁre on and drive off Western ships that might ap-
proach Japan.11)
Hayashi’s book and the expulsion edict are examples of what historians now call 
the debate about maritime defense (kaibo¯ron).  The debate became more prominent 
after China’s shocking defeat in the Opium War in 1842 and it effectively ended 
with the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the United States and Japan 
(Nichibei shu¯ko¯ tsu¯sho¯ jo¯yaku) in 1858.  That treaty opened Yokohama to foreign trade 
and left the bakufu with little choice but to accept the presence of foreign ships in 
Japanese waters.  Not everyone in Japan acquiesced to the presence of Westerners in 
Japan and samurai from Cho¯shu¯ domain famously attacked Western ships passing 
through the Straits of Shimonoseki in 1863, but such resistance was sporadic and in-
effective.  Consequently, after Yokohama opened as a treaty port the bakufu, along 
with several of the large costal domains, began to take serious steps toward creating 
a modern naval force that could protect Japan from the sea.  While the process of 
creating a modern navy began in the 1850s it was not very advanced and at the time 
of the Taiwan Expedition in 1874 the Japanese navy was still rather weak.
The Weaknesses of the Japanese Navy in the Early Meiji Period
Primary sources from 1874 suggest that the biggest weakness of the navy was a 
lack of adequate ships.  The bakufu and a few of the larger domains began buying 
and building a small number of Western-style ships in the 1850s but their number 
was inadequate and the lack of ships was exacerbated by other weaknesses.  Accord-
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ing to D. Eleanor Westney the Japanese navy modernized slowly for several reasons. 
To begin with, the government allocated more resources to expanding the army 
than to the navy because it feared the threat of domestic rebellion more than the 
threat of foreign invasion.  A second reason is that Japan lacked the industrial base 
needed to manufacture ships and the government could not afford to buy them from 
foreign countries.  For example, while the ﬁrst Japanese warship was built before the 
Meiji Restoration the second was not ﬁnished until 1876, and the Meiji government 
ordered only six new warships before 1886.  Three came from Japanese shipyards 
and the remaining three came from Britain, but the British ships were not delivered 
until 1878.  A third reason is the political weakness of the Navy Ministry.  Many of 
the leading ﬁgures in the navy had served in the bakufu and they did not enjoy the 
same power and prestige as leaders who had fought to overthrow the bakufu and in-
stall an imperial government.  This led to considerable factionalism and inﬁghting 
within the Navy Ministry and limited the ministry’s inﬂuence in the government.  A 
ﬁnal reason is that it took a long time to train a modern ofﬁcer corps in the navy. 
Students who went abroad for training typically spend about a decade overseas and 
they did not begin to return in sizeable numbers until 1878.  In the mid-1870s the 
Navy Ministry established a naval academy and other schools to train ofﬁcers but 
the navy did not see the beneﬁt of these efforts until the 1880s.12)  For a variety of 
reasons, then, the modernization of the navy proceeded slowly and at the time of the 
Taiwan Expedition in 1874 the navy simply did not have enough good ships or 
trained personnel to carry out the fairly modest invasion of southern Taiwan much 
less to establish or sustain colonies there.
The lack of adequate ships was obvious early in the invasion, and we can see this 
in an interesting comment written by an American naval ofﬁcer named Douglas 
Cassel who went with the invasion force to southern Taiwan as an advisor.  One of 
his jobs was to help establish a colony on the east coast of the island at Pilam (pres-
ent-day Taidong), in an area that would be difﬁcult to reach without a good steam-
ship.  In a long letter that he wrote to LeGendre he included a brief passage that ex-
pressed his frustration about the poor quality of Japanese ships:
Every day since I came here the advantages, nay, the necessity, of a suitable 
vessel for this work has been more and more forcibly brought home to me, and 
I feel more convinced than ever that the “Tabor” is the only suitable vessel at-
tainable.  Do not fail to insist upon her presence here at the earliest moment… 
I consider her as a necessity to the work upon the East Coast.13)
Cassel, an accomplished naval ofﬁcer, wanted a reliable steamship to land Japa-
nese troops and supplies on the east coast of Taiwan in order to establish a colony 
there, and in his view there was literally only one ship in Japan that was adequate 
for that task.  In March, 1870 the Japanese government bought the French paddle 
steamer Thabor and put the ship at the disposal of the Ministry of Engineering 
(Ko¯busho¯ ).  The ministry hired the British captain Albert B. Brown to command the 
vessel and put him in charge of establishing and maintaining a network of lighthous-
es in Japan.14)  The vessel Cassel wanted to use was not, in fact, even a navy ship but 
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the navy could easily have had the Thabor temporarily reassigned just as the govern-
ment had temporarily reassigned Brown to assist the expedition.15)  In the end the 
Thabor was never sent to Pilam as Cassel hoped, probably because the government 
decided not to follow through with its plans to establish colonies.  Cassel’s letter 
shows, however, that Japan simply did not have enough suitable ships to carry out 
the hard work of imperialism.
The Japanese navy also had problems getting relief personnel and supplies to Tai-
wan.  A few months after the army arrived in southern Taiwan many of the soldiers 
and laborers there began to get sick with malaria, and by September the Japanese 
government had to send new troops and laborers to replace them.  By early October 
the malaria epidemic had incapacitated the expeditionary force, and the govern-
ment urgently needed to send more soldiers, laborers and medicine to Taiwan.  The 
problem is that the navy did not have enough ships to transport people and supplies, 
and as a result it had to rely on Japanese commercial vessels.16)  The problems the 
navy encountered using its ships to support the army in Taiwan were exacerbated 
by the fact that just as the malaria epidemic in southern Taiwan reached its 
peak O¯kubo Toshimichi, with the support of the cabinet, decided to travel to China 
in Japan’s most powerful warship, the Ryu¯jo¯kan, in order to engage in negotiations 
with the Qing government.17)  O¯kubo’s trip involved more than just the Ryu¯jo¯kan, 
however, since it had to be accompanied by escort vessels, and even this largely 
symbolic example of gunboat diplomacy further limited the navy’s ability to send 
supplies and reinforcements to the expedition army in southern Taiwan.  The gener-
al impression given by various sources is that the Japanese navy had difﬁculty sup-
porting an army that was merely occupying southern Taiwan and was not doing any 
ﬁghting.  If war had broken out the problem would have been much more severe and 
the navy would have been incapable of supporting an army that had been incapaci-
tated by illness.
The Japanese navy also had serious problems maintaining professional behavior 
among its sailors.  One incident involved the harassment of Chinese women by Japa-
nese sailors whose ship stopped in the port of Keelung to take on coal.  According to 
British diplomatic sources from June, 1874 Japanese soldiers engaged in “lawless 
conduct” toward women there.18)  A more damning description of the low morale 
and discipline on board Japanese navy vessels was offered by Captain Brown who 
paid a visit to the Hokkai-maru in Nagasaki at the beginning of May, 1874.  Condi-
tions on board the ship appalled him so greatly that he felt compelled to inform 
LeGendre, who passed the information on to O¯kuma Shigenobu, the civilian leader 
in charge of the expedition.19)  Brown expressed his concerns frankly in his letter to 
LeGendre.
I feel it is my duty to lay before you a statement shewing the disgraceful state of 
this vessel, both as regards the ship herself, and also the discipline on board.
In the ﬁrst place I may state that at present the “Hokai Maru” is in reality little 
better than a wreck, ropes and all gear rotten, and the rigging completely drop-
ping off the mastheads, below everything in the greatest state of disorder, con-
fusion, dirt and ﬁlth imaginable.  In the saloon the ships property is being de-
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stroyed, lost, and broken, for the want of someone able to look after it.  The 
ship has evidently been greatly neglected for a considerable time…
On Saturday night-last it was blowing a gale and I considered it prudent to 
have an ofﬁcer on deck to look after the safety of the ship, but found that Mr. 
Maida was sick, Mr. Nangau on shore, and as Mr. Frank had been working all 
day I could scarcely ask him to remain up all night, so that there was no one to 
do the duty required.
Yesterday afternoon on my going on board I found Mr. Nangau in the lower sa-
loon entertaining a lot of singing girls, and I have reason to believe some of the 
sendoes [boatmen] were there also, thus making the ship little better than a 
Brothel.
I can only say in conclusion that I consider the “Hokai Maru” to be a disgrace 
to the Japanese ﬂag, and beg some steps be taken to put matters on a more sat-
isfactory footing, and with this brief I would suggest the following alterations.
That a foreign 2nd ofﬁcer be appointed, and also ﬁve Manilla men for mending 
sails, steering etc., also a Head Boy to take charge of the saloon.  Also that Mr. 
Maida be sent to Hospital, and Mr. Nangau severely reprimanded and the Pay-
master compelled to live on board, and attend to his duties.20)
Brown’s description makes it clear that the condition of the ship left much to be 
desired.  The ship was poorly maintained and discipline was so nearly absent that 
the Japanese ofﬁcers could not or did not do their jobs.  Undoubtedly some of the 
ships in the navy were maintained better than the Hokkai-maru, but this example 
suggests that the navy had not solved basic problems of how to train sailors and 
ofﬁcers and how to maintain standards of discipline and maintenance.
Captain Brown’s suggestion that the navy hire another foreign ofﬁcer to serve on 
the Hokkai-maru points to another problem with the Japanese navy in the early Meiji 
period: it did not have enough people who could sail its ships, and it especially 
lacked ship captains.  To be sure, all of the Japanese ships had Japanese command-
ing ofﬁcers but the ships were effectively under the command of foreigners, nearly 
all of whom were British or American.  One example of this problem can be seen in 
an incident that took place a few months before the Taiwan Expedition when a Japa-
nese Army ofﬁcer named Kabayama Sukenori wanted to visit Pilam.  Kabayama be-
gan his explorations of Taiwan in August, 1873 by going to the Suao area, near the 
northeast coast of the island, where he hoped to establish a Japanese base of opera-
tions that would be used in the effort to colonize eastern Taiwan beginning with the 
Nanao area that lay just south of Suao.  Although his efforts seemed to start well 
they ended in utter failure and the experience soured Kabayama on the prospect of 
establishing a Japanese presence in the north.  Instead, he turned his attention to the 
southeastern coast of the island, focusing speciﬁcally on visiting the area around Pi-
lam where he wanted to establish ties with an aborigine leader named Ansheng.
In his diary entry for March 9, 1874 Kabayama writes:
I hoped to do explorations from this port [Takao] around to the waters on the 
east side [of the island].  The plan was to do some exploring in the vicinity of 
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Butan and then to go up to Pilam to meet the aborigine [banshajin] named An-
shin [Ansheng] who helped rescue our countrymen last summer, and to remain 
there in order to take advantage of the opportunity to guide [yu¯do¯ ] that area. 
Of course I thought that if my plan was implemented the navy’s future strategy 
would be easier, so I decided to travel once again on the warship [Kasuga], and 
since Mr. James had gone ashore this evening I went to the British Consulate 
where he instructed me about the difﬁculties involved in traveling around to 
the east of Taiwan.  Not surprisingly some of the equipment on board has been 
damaged, and if it were physically impossible to sail around [the island] my in-
dulgence would strand us in the middle of the sea.  I felt a regret that I could 
not contain.  So we will have to consider once again plans for the colonial rec-
lamation [shokumin kaikon] in the Nanao area in the north.
James, an Englishman who had sailed with the Kasuga from Japan to help pilot 
the ship, promptly threw cold water on Kabayama’s proposal to visit the southeast-
ern coast because the ship had suffered damage and was not up to the task, a frank 
assessment that underscored the inability of the Japanese navy to its project force 
overseas because it did not have adequate ships.21)  The role James played in decid-
ing how the Kasuga would be used also underscored the fact that a foreign captain 
exercised effective command of the ship.
The Japanese navy’s reliance on foreign captains can be seen elsewhere as well. 
For example the Japanese government printed a landscape map of Shaliao Bay, 
where the expeditionary force intended to land, that included written instructions in 
both Japanese and English to help ship captains recognize the location of the bay.22) 
The print was prepared by Douglas Cassel, who had been recruited by LeGendre to 
help the Japanese carry out the invasion and occupation of southern Taiwan, and the 
image of the terrain in the print was based on a landscape drawing of the area that 
had been done during a visit by LeGendre to southern Taiwan in March, 1872.  Cas-
sel had also gone to Shaliao Bay at that time, as an ofﬁcer on board a U.S. navy ship 
that transported LeGendre there.  Several other Americans and Britons, such as 
Captain Brown, helped the Japanese navy carry out the expedition by serving as the 
effective captains of the Japanese troop transport ships and warships that brought 
the Japanese expeditionary force to southern Taiwan and helped sustain it once it 
was there.  Since none of the Western ship captains or Japanese ofﬁcers had ever 
been to southern Taiwan, with the exception of Cassel, they would have had 
difﬁculty recognizing Shaliao Bay, the primary anchorage at which the expedition 
planned to land its troops.  Cassel’s landscape print of the bay served as a bilingual 
aid to help the Japanese ofﬁcers and foreign captains alike identify the anchorage. 
As these examples show the Japanese navy had to rely on foreign captains because 
they lacked the trained personnel needed to command their ships.
The fact that Japanese navy ships were under the command of foreigners would 
have caused a major problem if Japan had declared war on China, and concern 
about the involvement of foreign personnel in the expedition nearly led to its cancel-
lation.  The problem, in short, had to do with the special status that foreigners en-
joyed in China under the unequal treaties.  If foreign ship captains helped the Japa-
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nese during a war against China their nations would no longer be considered neutral 
and they would lose the extraterritorial protection they enjoyed under the treaties. 
A major diplomatic problem arose because of this particular problem when Britain’s 
Minister to Japan, Harry Parkes, voiced concerns about the participation of British 
personnel in the expedition.
By early April, 1874 Parkes had ﬁgured out that the expedition actually intended 
to colonize part of Taiwan and that punishing the aborigines was simply a pretext. 
Concerned that the expedition might provoke war between China and Japan, Parkes 
telegraphed Thomas Wade, the British minister in Beijing, on April 11 to alert him 
to the imminent dispatch of the expedition and its purposes.23)  After that foreign 
opposition to the expedition began to spread.  While British ofﬁcials no doubt 
wished to protect their nation’s commercial interests in China from the disruptions 
of war they also had a serious concern about maintaining British neutrality in a pos-
sible war between Japan and China.  In a number of exchanges with Foreign Minis-
ter Terashima Munenori, Parkes sought a clariﬁcation of Japan’s motives for sending 
the expedition to Taiwan and assurances that Japan had obtained China’s assent. 
On April 13 he informed Terashima that “If the Japanese Government has come to 
a clear understanding with that of China on this subject no difﬁculty will of course 
occur, but if on the other hand the Chinese government should regard the expedi-
tion as hostile to themselves, Your Excellency will readily perceive that all British 
subjects engaged in it would have to be at once recalled.”24)  The Japanese govern-
ment had been relying on verbal assurances made by the Qing government in June, 
1873, and because it lacked written assurances that a Japanese force would be per-
mitted to land in southern Taiwan Western diplomats remained skeptical about the 
participation of their countries’ nationals in the expedition.25)
Parkes found an ally in the Japan Daily Herald, which ran a story on April 17 that 
leveled scathing criticism at the U.S. Minister John Bingham for abetting the Japa-
nese by permitting American ships—which had been chartered by the Japanese 
government—to participate in the expedition.  The criticism, however unfounded, 
had the intended effect of prodding Bingham into action.  Bingham contacted Ter-
ashima the following day and, citing the Herald article, inquired whether “any ships 
of the United States have been chartered under the authority of the government of 
Japan to engage in a military expedition against and hostile to Formosa, and wheth-
er any ofﬁcers or citizens of the United Sates have been employed by the govern-
ment of Japan in such expedition,” and he protested the Japanese government’s us-
ing U.S. citizens or ships in hostile action against China.  Terashima offered 
assurances that the expedition had no hostile intent toward China, but Bingham re-
fused to accept Terashima’s explanation until Japan had received written consent to 
the expedition from China, and he reiterated his demand that U.S. citizens and 
ships not be used.  In response to Bingham’s protests the Japanese government 
agreed to “detach” from the expedition the U.S. transport ship New York and the ad-
visors LeGendre and Cassel.26)  The unexpected reaction from the foreign ministers 
in Tokyo prompted the Japanese cabinet to backtrack, and on April 19 it decided to 
postpone the expedition,27) but Saigo¯ Tsugumichi, the commander in charge of the 
expeditionary force, dispatched part of the force from Nagasaki before it could be 
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recalled.  The government, faced with a fait accompli, had little choice but to go for-
ward with the expedition.  Still, because of Bingham’s pressure the chartered Ameri-
can ship withdrew from the expedition and the Japanese government had to scram-
ble to buy transport ships that foreign merchants were happy to sell them at inﬂated 
prices.28)
Because a potential Sino-Japanese conﬂict might affect the special rights they en-
joyed under the unequal treaties, the stakes were quite high for the British and 
American governments.  If war had broken out between China and Japan the Brit-
ish and Americans would have required all their people to stop working on Japanese 
ships, and that very likely would have crippled the Japanese navy because the Japa-
nese captains were ill-prepared to command their own ships in case of war.  Lack of 
trained personnel was a serious weakness of the Japanese navy at the time of the Tai-
wan Expedition.
Conclusion
It is obvious from Japan’s invasion of southern Taiwan in 1874 that the Japanese 
navy simply was not prepared to establish or support a colonial empire.  It was wide-
ly believed at the time that if Japan wanted to establish a colonial empire in East 
Asia then war with China would be unavoidable, and such a war would necessarily 
involve naval battles.  It was also clear from the Taiwan Expedition that Japan was 
not prepared to ﬁght those battles.  The Japanese navy did not have enough ships to 
support a static occupation of southern Taiwan much less to ﬁght effective battles at 
sea, and the quality of its ships was poor.  The navy’s lack of well-trained personnel, 
especially captains, to operate and command its ships was nearly as important a 
problem.  The navy barely managed to support an occupation army that had aban-
doned its plans to establish colonies and it was even less prepared to ﬁght the naval 
battles that would have resulted from war with China if Japan had followed through 
with the plan to colonize Taiwan.  In sum, in 1874 the Japanese navy was not up to 
the hard work of imperialism.
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